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Abstract 
While organizations and individuals tend to focus on learning from success, research has 
shown that failure can yield crucial insights in various contexts that range from small 
mistakes and errors, product recalls, accidents, and medical errors, to large-scale disasters. 
This review of the literature identifies three mechanisms—opportunity, motivation, and 
ability—through which individuals, groups and organizations learn from failure, and it 
bridges the gaps between different levels of analysis. Opportunity to learn from failure mostly 
takes the shape of more information about errors and failures that are generated by one’s own 
and others’ prior failures or near-failures. Motivation to learn from failure is hindered by 
punitive leaders and organizations. Finally, ability to learn from failure partly relies on 
inherent attitudes and characteristics; but can be further developed through thoughtful 
analysis and transfers of successful routines. Our review leads us to distinguish between 
erroneous versus correct processes and adverse versus successful outcomes to better 
understand the full gamut of events that are faced by organizations. We identify the existence 
of noisy learning environment, where spurious successes (when erroneous processes still lead 
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2
to successful outcomes) and spurious failures (when correct processes are combined with 
adverse outcomes) lower the opportunity to learn. Considering noisy learning situations is 
helpful when understanding the differences between slow- and fast-learning environments. 
We conclude our review by identifying a number of unexplored areas we hope scholars will 
address to better our understanding of failure learning. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Sometimes we may learn more from a man's errors, than from his virtues.  
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow 
 
Individuals and organizations repeatedly confront failures that range from small technical 
errors and mistakes to product breakdowns to large-scale disasters. Failure can stigmatize 
individual and organizational reputations, and it can be extremely costly for organizations and 
society. Failure is also more noticeable than success because negative information is more 
salient than positive information (Ito, Larsen, Smith & Cacioppo, 1998). As a consequence, 
individuals and organizations strongly prefer success, which makes learning from failure 
difficult because both the reporting of errors and other failures as well as the correct analysis 
and response are risky and emotionally fraught. However, learning from failures is critical for 
both operational performance and safety—failure learning is necessary for quality 
improvements and efficiency gains in production processes, and systematic failure reporting 
and analyses have been key for reductions in transportation accidents and adverse events in 
hospitals. Because of failure’s significance, the research on the topic spans many fields such 
as psychology (cf. Ellis & Davidi, 2005; Hofmann & Mark, 2006), organizational studies (cf. 
Reason, 1997; Zhao & Olivera, 2006), strategic management (cf. Muehlfeld, Sahib, & van 
Witteloostuijn, 2012), sociology (cf. Perrow, 1999), and health care management (cf. Hoff, 
Jameson, Hannan, & Flink, 2004; Kohn, Corrigan, Donaldson, 1999). Importantly, failures 
provide valuable learning opportunities: individuals and organizations modify their practices 
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3
to prevent similar future failures and to improve performance (Sitkin, 1992). Without 
examining failure learning, our understanding of success learning is also inherently biased 
(Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Denrell, 2003). Recognizing the potential of failure to improve 
performance, recent studies on failure have begun to shift their focus from why and how 
failure occurs in organizations to how individuals and organizations do (or do not) learn from 
failure. 
Failure learning has become a distinct area in the organizational learning literature, and 
it has attracted growing attention from scholars who seek to understand the phenomenon in 
various contexts such as product recalls (Haunschild & Rhee, 2004), project failure 
(Shepherd, Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011), bankruptcies (Kim & Miner, 2007), healthcare errors and 
incidents (Chuang et al. 2007; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007), and accidents (Baum & Dahlin, 
2007; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002). The studies on failure learning cover multiple levels of 
analysis and draw from a variety of theoretical frames to understand how actors do (or do not) 
learn from failure. While an array of factors that affect failure learning has been identified, 
there is a lack of systematic integration across levels of analysis and settings; hence, the 
collective wisdom about how to best learn from failure is limited and fragmented. 
Importantly, the studies on failure learning borrow much from traditional learning studies, but 
the links and dissimilarities are not clearly understood. Studies that have attempted to 
combine success and failure learning lack conclusive findings and theory exploring how these 
events are related. To that end, there is a greater divide between traditional learning studies 
and failure learning studies than is currently being theorized.  
We conduct a review of failure learning studies and synthesize them to better 
understand the underlying mechanisms that influence failure learning. We apply the 
framework of opportunity, motivation, and ability to integrate and discuss learning factors at 
the individual, group, and organizational levels. Specifically, opportunity represents a 
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4
mechanism that provides information or sufficient time to analyze the cause-effect of failures; 
motivation captures different actors’ willingness to act on failure information and to engage in 
failure learning activity; and ability represents actors’ skills or knowledge base to change their 
actions based on failure information (Argote, 2012; Reinholt, Pedersen & Foss, 2011). 
Mapping the studies of failure learning at multiple levels of analysis with this framework can 
generate new insights for future work. 
We argue that it is important to clearly separate between processes and outcomes and to 
acknowledge that bad processes do not always lead to failed outcomes and, conversely, that 
correct processes might still result in failed outcomes. A traditional focus on “successful 
processes—successful outcomes” versus “failed processes—failed outcomes” overlooks the 
fact that “successful processes—failed outcomes” and “failed processes—successful 
outcomes” are common. We call these last two process-outcome combinations spurious 
failures and spurious successes. When they are common, these combinations produce noise in 
traditional learning processes that negatively affects opportunity, motivation, and ability to 
learn. A complete understanding of process-outcome relationships in organizational learning 
helps to address a fundamental critical question of why we see a systematic decrease in 
failures in one setting, whereas in another we do not. While the risk of dying in a car accident 
has diminished by 50% over the last 25 years, and the risk of train accidents has been reduced 
by 70% (NCSA, 2015; FRA, 2016), the risk of dying from a hospital error has increased by 
350%
1
 (Binder, 2013; Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, 2000). 
Below, we begin our review by defining failures and failure learning as well as errors 
and error learning, followed by a review of the failure and error learning literatures at three 
levels of analysis, clustering mechanisms under the opportunity-motivation-ability headings. 
We highlight the key constructs and mechanisms that can be identified as influencing learning 
                                                      
1 Part of the increase is due to new definitions and better measurement of preventable hospital errors. The 
numbers are also challenged; however, overall it is clear that there is little to no improvement, which still 
demonstrates the contrast with transportation accidents. 
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5
processes and outcomes. From there, we discuss how the four process-outcome combinations 
influence the opportunity, motivation, and ability that are associated with failure learning. 
Finally, synthesizing and assessing the literature as a whole, we identify the research 
challenges in failure learning and discuss the promising research opportunities that may 
advance our understanding of failure learning. 
 
DEFINING SCOPE: FAILURE, ERRORS, AND FAILURE LEARNING  
There is a literature on errors and another literature on failures in organizations. They are 
related, and many of the mechanisms and findings overlap. In fact, they often use the same  
definition for errors and failures, that they “deviate from expected and desired goals” 
(Rasmussen, 1982; Reason, 1990; Leape, 1974; Zhao & Olivera, 2003; Sitkin, 1992). The 
literatures do also differ since errors are incorrectly executed tasks or routines (such as a train 
engineer who drives a train over the speed limit or a nurse who gives the incorrect medication 
to a patient), while failures are undesired performance outcomes (a train accident occurring 
instead of the train getting from point A to point B as planned; a patient who dies after 
surgery instead of leaving the hospital healthier than before entering it). 
With regard to errors, they have been classified by Rasmussen (1982) into rule-based 
errors (breaking a known rule), skill-based errors (making a mistake or forgetting) and 
knowledge-based errors (not knowing enough). Another error typology is whether the error is 
action-based or related to decision-making (Lei, Naveh, & Novikov, 2016; Zhao & Olivera, 
2006). Nevertheless, not all errors, mistakes or incidents necessarily lead to failure. Some 
errors and mistakes can even produce positive outcomes, such as the discovery of new 
organizational processes and innovation, or be too insignificant have any impact on an event’s 
eventual success or failure (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005). 
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6
Failures may be caused by a combination of errors such as incorrectly executed routines 
and tasks, violations, risks, or chance factors (Frese & Keith, 2015; Hofmann & Frese, 2011). 
It can be avoidable or unavoidable, intentional or unintentional. It can involve human action 
and organizational processes and arrangements (e.g., Ramanujam & Goodman, 2003; Reason, 
1997).  
We define error and failure learning as the process by which individuals, groups, or 
organizations identify error or failure events, analyze such events to find their causes, and 
search for and implement solutions to prevent similar errors or failures in the future. This 
definition is consistent with the definitions of learning in the organizational learning literature 
(Argote, 2012). The outcomes of error and failure learning can therefore include changes in 
understanding (Huber, 1991), behaviors (Chuang & Baum, 2003; Ginsburg et al., 2009; 
Shepherd, Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011) or performance improvement (Cannon & Edmondson, 
2001; Dahlin & Baum, 2007; Heimbeck, et al., 2003; Zhao, 2011). 
We aimed to be inclusive, if not exhaustive, in identifying studies on error and failure 
learning and searched key management, health management and safety journals for relevant 
studies, focusing mostly but not exclusively on the period from year 2000. All identified 
articles were sorted by their level(s) of analysis. We reviewed the learning mechanisms in the 
articles and categorized them according to failure learning triggers, clustering them under 
three headings: opportunity to learn, motivation to learn, and ability to learn.  
 
OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN FROM FAILURE 
Opportunity to learn refers to the scope of information and the time that allows actors to 
learn from failure events. Information-based opportunity refers to the amount of information 
that is available about similar failure events because such events can provide information 
about failure causes (Argote, 2012). Time-based opportunity refers to the time that is given to 
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actors to reflect upon failure events and to analyze the information that can be derived from 
the events to learn from them and the time in which to execute an action that is related to a 
failure learning activity (cf. Carroll, 1963). Information-based opportunities are usually 
studied by quantifying the amount of available information about similar failure events 
(number, frequency, recency), information access owing to group composition, organizational 
members’ networks and information diffusion inside or between organizations. By contrast, 
time-based opportunity refers to how much time that is available to  process information 
and/or carrying out a task (Carroll, 1963).  
Information-based learning opportunities are often measured as one’s own or others’ 
prior experiences with similar failure events (counted as the of number of events or the 
number of cumulative events in previous time periods) and as how organizational structures 
and routines influence the diffusion of failure-learning-related information. Experience and its 
effect on learning are the most common empirical approach, and while this was first studied 
in production settings that range from classic cases of airplane construction to that of liberty 
ship builders (Wright 1936; Thompson, 2001) and learning curves, which refers to the idea 
that cumulative experience affects performance at a decreasing rate, the experience and its 
effect on learning have come to be applied across levels of analysis, and used across a large 
number of settings—among them failure learning.  
Two different processes convert experiences into better performance: learning-by-doing 
and analytical learning. Learning-by-doing is mostly automatic and tacit, while analytical 
learning involves active decision-making that uses information about a prior event to reshape 
future routines (Thomson, 2012; Reason, 1990). Failure learning theories are much more 
concerned with the active decision-making theory, especially on the individual and group 
levels, while few organizational learning curve studies separate empirical and theoretically 
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8
between learning by doing and analytical learning (see Lapré, Mukherjee & Van Wassenhove, 
2000; or Sinclair, Klepper & Cohen, 2000 for exceptions).
2
   
Time-based, or temporal, learning opportunities are concerned with the amount of time 
that an actor has to execute a routine or to process information about a routine that has gone 
wrong. Outside of the realm of student learning, relatively few studies have examined 
temporal mechanisms. Exceptions in failure learning a small number of studies that analyze 
the impact of workload and slack (Malone et al. 2007; Lawton, et al. 2012) and how the speed 
of assimilating and analyzing relevant information affects work processes and routines 
(Edmondson, et al. 2001). In addition, autonomy provides the mental and operational space 
that can allow individuals to prioritize their tasks, allowing them the time that they need to 
learn from failure (Kerr, 2009; Stern et al., 2008).  
 
Individual and group level opportunities to learn from failure 
A wide range of studies have examined how information-based and time-based opportunities 
lead to failure learning. While some learning opportunities lead to automatic reduction of 
errors and failures, this concerns mainly errors such as slips and mistakes. In contrast 
knowledge-based errors and failures require more deliberate reflection to reduce the 
likelihood of repeating them (Iedema et al. 2006). A study examining the effect cardiac 
surgeons’ prior experience had on learning, demonstrated that past surgery failures improved 
a surgeon’s future surgery outcomes (KC, Staats, & Gino, 2013). Moreover, other cardiac 
surgeons’ failures interacted with the surgeon’s own prior failures to further improve the 
surgeon’s surgery outcomes. In other words, one’s own and others’ failure experiences can 
have a joint effect on learning: any related failure provides an opportunity to reflect on what 
                                                      
2
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has gone wrong and how to improve procedures. Interestingly, the positive interaction effect 
suggest that information-based experience can have an increasing return on failure learning.  
        Temporal opportunities such as working conditions affect how experiences are converted 
into lower error rates. Residents with greater work autonomy, that is, they “perceive that they 
have the freedom and discretion to plan, schedule and carry out their jobs” were found to have 
higher error reduction (Stern et al., 2008, p. 1554). Task autonomy allowed the residents to 
reflect on errors and learn from them by making procedural changes. When the organizational 
climate was such that learning was encouraged, the residents took more time to reflect on 
work processes and errors and further reduced their own errors, thus, motivation (climate) and 
opportunity (time) interacted to accelerate learning (ibid.). 
Teams play an important role in error learning (Edmondson et al. 2001); however, when 
the environment is ambiguous and changing, team information processing becomes 
complicated, which hampers learning. Individual and group levels of learning are intertwined 
as individual characteristics and team composition jointly determine teams’ error reporting 
(Edmondson, 1996). Good member coordination (Baker et al. 2006) and common goals 
(Tjosvold, et al. 2004) enable teams to benefit from the full potential of each of their 
members. In the same way, team stability and work processes enable the group to better 
process information (Edmondson, 1996). When error information gathering activity is not a 
part of existing team routines (Lawton, et al. 2012), or the team does not have enough 
autonomy to allow it to collect critical information (Kerr, 2009), learning might not occur. In 
other words, having neither established nor improvised ways to gather failure information 
reduces opportunities to learn from failure experiences.  
Group characteristics can also influence information-based learning. Group diversity 
and intergroup linkages are two mechanisms that provide teams with access to a wide range 
of information which, in turn, reduce failure rates (Chuang, et al., 2007; Tucker & 
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10
Edmondson, 2003). Member rotation is another way to expose teams to a greater flow of 
information that can enable them to better analyze problems (Argote & Todorova, 2007). In 
addition, the time aspect matters here—being exposed to many different but related 
experiences in a short amount of time benefits learning. Experience also transfers across 
levels: group-level success experience has been found to help individual-level failure 
learning, which ultimately benefits the learning rate of the organization as a whole (Zheng et 
al., 2013).  
 
Organization-level opportunity to learn from failure 
In our review of the literature, it emerged that information-based opportunity is the most 
studied organizational learning mechanism. To summarize across the organizational 
opportunity studies: experience matters in most cases and across a wide array of settings; 
however, it does so somewhat differently in different settings and organizations. The nature of 
an experience event, its outcome, rareness, and complexity, influence its learning impact. A 
trend in organizational-level studies is to separate one’s own versus others’ experiences and to 
focus on in which case one matters more than the other and when (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; 
Chuang & Baum, 2003; Kim & Miner, 2007; Madsen & Desai, 2010; Madsen, Dillon & 
Tinsley, 2016). 
Prior failure events provide opportunities to learn. Over time, as many problems are 
resolved or better managed, we would expect a diminishing return to experience, which yields 
a learning curve that is similar to that in production learning. In fact, there is rich empirical 
support that shows that learning curves have a similar shape with regard to failure reduction. 
Train, mining, and airline accidents have been found to reduce future accident propensity on 
the industry and firm levels (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Desai, 2016; Madsen, 2009; Haunschild 
& Rhee, 2004). The failure-reducing effect is strongest for recent accidents (Haunschild, 
Page 10 of 72Academy of Management Annals
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 
11
Polidoro & Chandler, 2015), accidents of larger magnitude, which are measured in terms of 
accident cost and level of injuries (Madsen, 2009), and events of high visibility (Desai, 2011), 
which are measured in terms of the media scrutiny of the accidents. There are two 
mechanisms that can induce organizations to learn from highly visible failures: in such cases, 
the information about causes and remedies is more available; however, the motivation to 
counteract accidents may also increase when outsiders pay more attention and reputations are 
at stake. When there is more press attention to an accident or a product recall, organizations 
invest more in activities that can reduce the risk of future accidents, such as a train line 
installing new track (Desai, 2011). 
The effect of recency, that more recent events have greater impact than older events on 
failure reduction, can also have multiple explanations. For instance, there is the proposition 
that new routines and practices make past experiences less relevant as time passes, or, as 
suggested by Haunschild et al. (2015), that an adverse event attracts an organization’s 
attention and motivates the organization to reduce the risk of future accidents; however, this 
motivation weakens over time as other important organizational goals take precedence. 
          Complex problems provide a greater opportunity to learn. A notable study supporting 
the argument that complex challenges trigger faster and more efficient learning is an 
investigation of British IVF clinics, which demonstrates how opportunity affects learning 
(Stan & Vermeulen, 2013). The key performance metric of IVF clinics is live births per 
treatment cycle, and a key aim is to lower the number of failed cycles. Whereas private clinics 
could choose to accept only patients with good prognoses, which meant fewer failures, public 
clinics were not allowed to screen patients and therefore had higher failure rates at the start of 
their activities. However, working with more difficult cases enhanced the information-based 
learning of the public clinics, and they increased their ability to successfully treat any patient, 
which resulted in higher learning rates than those of private clinics. Working on complex 
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12
problems provided greater opportunity to find solutions to difficult problems and led to faster 
failure reduction across problems. The concept that complex failure situations provide richer 
information is in line with the finding that airlines learned more from complex accident 
causes than from simpler ones (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002) and that this was especially 
true for specialist airlines. Complex problems offered more venues for learning and 
counteracted simplified cause-effect analyses (e.g., simplifying failure attributions to factors 
that are beyond the organization’s control such as patient age in hospital cases or to pilot error 
in the case of airlines). 
          Whose experiences matter. Not only do failures that are experienced by an individual 
organization provide opportunities to learn, but the failures that are experienced by other 
organizations provide information for learning. Airlines learn both from their own and other 
airlines’ accidents (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002). Based on the behavioral theory of firm 
logic, which states that organizations are more likely to look further for better solutions when 
their peers outperform them, train companies that had more accidents compared to their peers 
were found to learn more from such peers rather than from their own accidents (Baum & 
Dahlin, 2007). Ontario nursing home chains learned from both their own and others' 
businesses with respect to naming their units. The learning effect, or willingness to change 
was dampened when the chain had followed a strategy for a long time (Chuang & Baum, 
2003).  
         Learning from near misses. It is not only failure events that provide information-based 
opportunities to learn, but such information can also be gleaned from events that are neither 
purely successful nor wholly failures (Rerup, 2006). Most attention has been given to near 
misses—when there is almost a failure but there are no direct negative consequences 
(Kessels-Habraken, et al. 2010). The opportunity to learn from near misses (especially those 
of others), or what is also known as latent errors (Reason, 1997; Ramanujam, 2003), is only 
Page 12 of 72Academy of Management Annals
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 
13
possible if such actions are recorded or easily observed. Kim and Miner (2007) used the 
ratings of banks to capture whether they were close to failing and found that near failures 
affected learning more than actual failures did. Building on industry insiders’ quotes, they 
found that near failures have greater informational content—whereas failed firms disappear 
from the industry and are forgotten, near failures remain and can tell their story and at the 
same time they also remind others of their survival. Perhaps more importantly, near failures 
combine bad performance with remedies for restoring performance after a period of trouble. 
Rather than telling a story of how to fail, they tell a story of redemption when one is close to 
failure. The greater informational content of the near failures means that there is a greater 
opportunity to learn from them. However, the reporting of near-misses and thus the 
information gathering process is more difficult because of the challenges in defining the scope 
of such events (Kessels-Habraken, et al. 2010). 
 
MOTIVATION TO LEARN FROM FAILURE 
Motivation is the desire or willingness to act in a certain way and, in the context of error and 
failure learning, the desire or willingness to invest in reducing adverse event frequency. 
Motivation to learn from failure therefore refers to the resource levels that are devoted by 
individuals and organizations to failure learning activity; such resources include attention and 
operational investments (Kanfer and Ackerman, 1989). Effective learning processes require 
individuals and organizations to allocate cognitive resources to (i) correctly identify and 
analyze error and failure causes and (ii) search for and implement solutions that prevent 
similar errors or failures in the future. Failure learning studies concerning motivation address 
contextual factors such as safety climate, psychological safety, leadership style and attitudes; 
cognitive and emotional barriers such as attribution errors (internal versus external); 
information processing in groups and, for organizational-level studies, factors that trigger 
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motivation such as high visibility events and public attention. Other organization-level 
motivation triggers include threats to ones’ reputation, social comparisons (doing worse than 
the competition), the recency of an event, and climate variables.  
 
Individual and group level motivation to learn from failure. 
Most individual-level studies on error and failure learning study motivational factors. In two 
laboratory studies, using a computer simulation task, Zhao (2011) found a positive association 
between participants’ self-reported motivation to learn from errors and their actual failure 
learning. In a field study of an Australian hospital, employees’ safety motivation had a 
positive effect on their safety participation, which was measured as behaviors that promote a 
safety-oriented environment (Neal & Griffin, 2006). While individual motivation affects 
learning behavior in both the lab and inside organizations, organizational factors affect 
individual motivation to learn from failure. For example, safety climate, which is defined as 
“perceptions of policies, procedures, and practices related to safety” (Neal & Griffin, 2006; 
956), plays an important role in motivating individual learning. Group-level safety promotion 
is positively associated with individual safety motivation and safety participation in hospitals 
(Buljac-Samardzic et al., 2012). There are both bottom-up and top-down processes between 
individuals and groups that help to produce a safety climate (Neal & Griffin, 2006). Group 
climate has been found to affect both individual motivation and individual behavior, and in a 
study of 33 organizations, individuals were more likely to report accidents when supervisors 
enforced safety policies (Probst, 2015). Adding the organizational level of analysis, individual 
attitudes to safety affects organizational learning by promoting a safety climate at the group 
level (Zohar & Luria, 2005). Individual safety motivation and engagement in failure learning 
activities both affect and are affected by group, managerial and organizational attitudes.  
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Motivation to learn from failure is also driven by individuals’ causal attributions 
concerning failures. In attribution theory, individuals cope with outcomes by making causal 
attributions to guide their future behaviors (Ilgen and Davis, 2000; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). 
Causal attribution involves how an individual allocates causes for a certain outcome, which, 
in turn, influence his or her motivation to learn. Specifically, individuals tend to attribute 
success to internal causes such as ability and effort, and failure to external causes such as 
environmental factors and luck (cf. Jones & Harris, 1967). At the same time, individuals often 
turn this around and attribute others’ successes to external causes and others’ failures to 
internal causes. Such attributions affect individual motivation to engage in failure learning 
activity (Chuang et al., 2007; Zhao and Olivera, 2006). Attribution theory helps us to better 
understand the previously discussed result that surgeons’ cumulative number of successful 
cardiac procedures had a greater impact on their future success rate than failed procedures 
had, while other surgeons’ cumulative number of failed procedures significantly helped to 
improve a cardiac surgeon’s subsequent success rate (KC et al., 2013). One can argue that 
surgeons attributed the prior successes to their own effort and actions, while the prior failures 
were attributed to uncontrollable factors. Thus, the surgeons assumed that there was little to 
learn from own failed procedures. In contrast, other surgeons’ failures were attributed to their 
efforts and actions, which made the focal surgeon more willing to review and learn from 
others’ failure causes. In a similar vein, individuals who work in teams attributed failure to 
actions that are taken by other individual team members rather than by the team when they 
experience poor team performance in a laboratory setting (Naquin and Tynan, 2003). 
However, this tendency decreased as subjects’ knowledge of teamwork increased. Another 
sign that attribution biases can be alleviated is a study in which individuals were better able to 
make internal attributions after failing in a task when they received after-event reviews that 
helped them to understand what contributed to their performance (Ellis, Mendel, and Nir, 
Page 15 of 72 Academy of Management Annals
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 
16
2006). Individuals who made more internal than external attributions improved their 
performance more. In a study of CEO attributions and organizational performance, Salancik 
and Meindl (1984) found an even stronger learning effect from internal attributions: when 
CEOs attributed poor firm performance to internal causes even when the low performance 
was clearly caused by an external factor, their firms performed better in subsequent periods. 
Internal attributions are clearly important for behavioral change. 
Failures often generate strong negative emotions (Paget, 1988) as individuals 
experience feelings of guilt, embarrassment or fear when they are involved in failures or make 
errors (Edmondson, 1996; Paget, 1988). Negative emotions prompt individuals to become 
more risk averse (Loewenstein et al., 2001), affect judgment (Forgas, 1995), and lower 
engagement in failure learning. In general, failure-induced negative emotions should lower 
individuals’ motivation to learn. However, in a laboratory study, negative emotions were 
instead positively associated with the motivation to learn (Zhao, 2011). The author explains 
this effect by suggesting that the strength of emotions matters, not just whether an emotion is 
negative, and negative emotion only affects learning above a relatively high threshold. If the 
strength of emotion matters, the finding that managerial error intolerance increases negative 
emotions suggests that managers’ attitudes can push staff into non-learning (Keith & Frese, 
2005).  
There are individual differences in the emotional response to failure and individual 
differences in coping orientations that help to explain the different emotions that are 
generated by failure as well as differences in the motivation to learn from failure: Individual 
affective organizational commitment—how loyal they feel towards their organizations—
decreased with negative emotions about failure (Shepherd et al., 2011); however, this link 
between negative emotions and failure was moderated by coping orientations when dealing 
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with failure. Negative emotions also decrease when individuals perceive that failure is a 
normal occurrence in their work environment (Shepherd et al. 2011). 
Individuals’ motivation to learn from failure is affected by psychological safety. Not to 
be confused with safety climate, psychological safety refers to the perception that it is safe to 
take interpersonal and professional risks in the workplace (Edmonson, 1999; Edmonson and 
Lei, 2014). Psychological safety has been found to positively influence failure learning by 
increasing an individual’s motivation to engage in failure learning activity (reporting failures 
and errors; willingness to discuss possible solutions) because the fear of negative 
consequences to self-image, status, or career are lower when psychological safety is high 
(Edmondson, 1996; Tjosvold, et al. 2004). Surveying three firms in the software, electronics 
and finance industries, Carmeli and Gittell (2009) found that psychological safety was 
positively associated with failure-based learning behaviors. 
At the group level, group norms shape learning from failure: compliance with norms 
motivates individuals to identify and record failures and to act to prevent them (e.g., Katz-
Navon et al., 2009; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007; Zohar, 2002). When studying groups in different 
functions in the same organization, sharing the same beliefs about how to cope with failure 
exerted great influence on failure learning (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001).  
Information sharing and interpersonal relationships within groups is another key 
element impacting how motivated teams’ are to learn from failures. Teams with cooperative 
rather than competitive goals learn more (Tjosvold, et al. 2004). Trust between the members 
of a team affects learning motivation (Carmeli et al. 2012). Comparing hospitals with similar 
characteristics but different failure learning rates, Edmondson et al., (2001) found that team 
member error information sharing affected the learning rate. In a similar fashion, managerial 
safety practices also affect the motivation to learn—managers who demonstrate that safety is 
important positively affect error reduction (Katz-Navon et al. 2009). Lack of information 
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sharing depends on the routines, awareness of others’ knowledge and status dynamics within 
groups: a study found that slower-learning groups had team members that did not bring 
attention to errors since they assumed, often incorrectly, that other team members are already 
aware of them (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, et al. 2001).  
According to Gersick & Hackman (1990), routines are double-edged swords: on the one 
hand, they can prevent team members from addressing failure by reducing their motivation to 
learn because change would upset the routine; however, on the other hand, routines create 
comfort within a group and lead to a climate where group members are more comfortable 
sharing what went wrong.  
A high team workload not only decreases the opportunity to learn, it also considerably 
reduces team motivation to learn from failure (Lawton et al. 2012), and it may ultimately 
affect the ability to change because the team might be unaware of the need to improve 
existing routines (Edmonton, et al. 2001). Team’s ability to manage its workload is also 
important, and teams that do better at his were found to improve their error rate faster 
(Lawton, et al. 2012). To reduce errors and failures routines often need replacing, but 
renewing routines is cumbersome, with preexisting routines being obstacles to change; thus, 
unless there is a clear rationale for why routines must change, groups are likely to resist 
change and may even implement defensive strategies with respect to learning processes, for 
example, by shifting responsibility and finding arguments to defend failing mechanisms 
(Hodgkinson & Wright, 2002). Workload is a time-dependent opportunity but also impacts 
motivation to learn since decisions that are made under time pressure may require individuals 
and groups to focus on a shorter-term horizon (Malone et al. 2007).  
 
Organization-level motivation to learn from failure.  
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A majority of the studies on how motivation affects error and failure are conducted in 
the health care context. There is a very real concern that hospitals are not reducing their error 
rates and are causing patient harm at a high rate (Leape, 1994; Kohn et al., 2000). The focus is 
often on how individual motivation to report errors is affected by organizational factors. The 
problem of non-reporting is high (Zhaou & Olivera, 2006; Ramanujam, 2003), which renders 
the analysis of error causes incomplete. The reason for an individual to not report an error that 
he or she made, or which was made by someone close, is often a lack of trust that responsible 
managers in the organization will conduct proper analyses to determine the true causes. It is a 
common and simple solution for organizations to blame an error on an individual (Hofmann 
& Stetzer, 1998; Rathert & May, 2007). The belief that organizations prefer to blame 
individuals rather than to find organizational causes is supported by data: Perrow (1999) 
reported that a re-examination of industrial accident causes where 70% to 80% were 
attributed to operator errors, in contrast found that operators had caused less than half of the 
accidents they were blamed for, or that 30% to 40% of accidents were caused by operator 
errors. 
In line with the tendency to blame the person who is closest to an error, factors that 
impede error reporting and analysis at the organizational level can be linked to the culture of 
blaming individuals rather than exploring other error causes (Khatri et al., 2009), ward 
climate (Lawton et al. 2012), whether health care work units are patient-centered (work is 
planned around the patient’s needs) (Rathert & May, 2007) and that when greater distance 
between professional groups in health care reduces the willingness of orderlies and nurses to 
admit to or discuss errors with doctors (Khatri et al., 2009). Organizational climate is a 
determinant that trickles down to affect both group and individual-level learning from failure. 
Motivational factors that have been studied outside health care are different. Based on 
the behavioral theory of firms, which states that organizations are more motivated to act and 
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change when they perform worse than they did in the past or when they perform worse than 
their competitors or peers (Cyert & March, 1963), Baum and Dahlin (2007) found that train 
companies that have higher accident costs than their peers learn faster but mainly from 
others’ experiences. Learning from others’ and not one’s own experiences might be due to 
poor failure performance: the organization might need external ideas of how to change 
behaviors. Another motivation study found that when an automobile manufacturer were 
forced to recall products and thus its reputation was challenged, the likelihood of future 
recalls was lowered (Haunschild & Rhee, 2004; Rhee, 2009). The effect in the auto recall case 
was curvilinear: low- and high-reputation car companies reduced recalls less than companies 
with medium reputations did. In a study that focused on how motivations change over time, 
Haunschild et al. (2015) found that a recent failure (in their case, a pharmaceutical product 
recall) made the organization work to reduce future such events; however, as time passed, 
other performance metrics, such as profits, reclaimed the organization’s attention and lowered 
the focus on failure reduction.  
Some findings on how attention impacts motivation contradict one another. While more 
media coverage after an accident motivates greater investment in infrastructure for train 
companies, thus reducing accident risks (Desai, 2011); more media coverage of the near-
misses involving air traffic controllers instead reduced the effect of prior near-misses on 
learning (Desai, 2014). This divergence could be explained by near- misses looking alarming 
to outsiders since an actual failure (airline accident) would have catastrophic consequences, 
while organizational members, in contrast, see a near-miss as a success since an error was 
rectified and a failure was avoided (Kessels-Habraken, et al. 2010; Dillon & Tinsley, 2008) . 
 
ABILITY TO LEARN FROM FAILURE 
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Ability to learn from failure concerns the capacity to identify and report failure; 
understanding failure leads to finding and implementing solutions to prevent future failures. 
Individual and group level studies are concerned with training, emotional responses, shared 
goals and managerial style, as well as the interaction between ability and motivation. 
Organization-level studies rarely measure directly ability but rather conclude that the 
unobservable variances across units or organizations are due to differences in ability. In health 
care, where geography makes competition between hospitals less of an issue, checklists are 
used for the transfer of best practices across units, which raises the ability to learn in 
organizations.  
 
Individual- and group-level ability to learn from failure 
The question of how to improve individuals’ ability to learn from their errors and failure 
experiences has led to a series of studies that focus on comparing different training methods 
and the role of post-event reviews. Keith and Frese (2005) compared error management 
training, which explicitly addresses individuals who make errors during training and uses 
these errors as learning exercises and error avoidance training, which instead focuses on 
preventing participants from making errors. Error management training enhanced individuals’ 
capacity to cope with, and generate solutions to, new problems. Error management training 
also led to better emotion control and metacognitive activity, which in turn improved 
individuals’ ability to cope with new problems. Individual differences interact with training 
method so that individuals with better cognitive ability and higher openness to experience 
were found to perform better during error management training than if they had received no 
training or only training with a focus on error avoidance situations. Error management 
training not only provides trainees with opportunities to make errors but also to receive 
informative feedback; overall, these programs increase an individual’s ability to learn from 
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failure. Thus, the ability to learn from failure can be actively developed, and such training is 
more effective when it is paired with high motivation to learn from failure (Katz-Navon, et al. 
2005). 
A laboratory study on how to enhance individuals’ ability to draw lessons from previous 
experiences found that after-event reviews of both successful and failed events had a positive 
impact on individual learning (Ellis and Davidi, 2005). The after-event reviews followed a 
similar but more extensive process than that of error management training because it also 
included successful events. While the participants’ mental models of failure events were 
richer than those of success events, the performance improvements were greater when the 
after-event reviews focused on both failures and successes. In a follow-up study, any type of 
after-event review (success, failure or both types of events) was found to lead to better 
performance compared with no after-event review. Interestingly, for individuals who 
experienced successful events, the after-event reviews that focused on the failure factors that 
led to the greatest performance improvements had a greater impact than no reviews, reviews 
that focused on success factors, or on both success and failure factors (Ellis et al., 2006). 
Individual differences in how failure is processed has an impact on failure learning. 
Studying three types of coping orientations: loss, restoration, and oscillation, Shepherd and 
colleagues (2011) analyzed how these orientations affected (self-reported) learning. Loss 
orientation refers to the explicitly processing of a failure to break the emotion that is 
associated with the failure (a failed project). Restoration orientation refers to suppressing 
feelings of loss and instead proactively focusing on the tasks that arise as a consequence of 
the failure rather than preventing future failures. An oscillation orientation refers to moving 
back and forth between loss and restoration orientations. Individuals who have stronger loss 
and oscillation orientations reported a better ability to learn from previous project failure than 
those with a restoration orientation. Apparently, the necessary element is the capacity to 
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emotionally disconnect from the failure, which suggests that effective learning involves 
managing the emotions that are evoked by a failure.  
An individual’s ability and motivation to learn from failures are affected by emotional 
states. The ability to learn is enhanced when the environment is emotionally supportive: 
Individuals must feel comfortable applying their knowledge and acquiring new knowledge to 
learn from failures. An individual’s perception of psychological safety and the quality of his 
or her relationships with others in an organization are positively associated with failure 
learning (Carmeli and Gittell, 2009). High-quality relationships, which are manifested in 
shared goals, shared knowledge, and mutual respect, not only promote psychological safety 
but also enhance information processing and coordination capacity, which in turn have 
positive effects on the capacity to learn from failure. 
Individuals can also encourage failure learning at the group level with a positive 
leadership style, which includes clear direction and effective coaching (Cannon & 
Edmondson, 2001; Katz-Navon et al., 2009): leadership style can motivate learning; however, 
it also reflects the group’s ability to learn and a leader’s ability to enhance group learning. For 
example, when a CEO fosters psychological trust in a top management team (between the 
CEO and the team, and within the team), the team is more likely to engage in failure learning 
and to produce high quality strategic decisions (Carmeli, et al. 2012). 
Because individuals in organizations are embedded in groups, studies have stressed 
teamwork to be an important factor for failure learning (Baker, et al. 2006; Morey, et al. 
2002). Many studies of ability involve overlapping and interactive effects between motivation 
and ability, and some determinants are related to both mechanisms. Efficient teamwork relies 
on coordination and communication, which can be actively promoted (Baker et al. 2006) 
using formal training to improve team collaboration (Morey et al. 2002). Ability to foster 
cooperative goals also triggers failure learning (Tjosvold, et al. 2004). Most ability-type 
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factors can be taught, and they can, in turn, nurture group motivation to learn. Other group-
level factors that improve group learning ability are group member stability, understanding of 
team processes, and training to reduce attribution biases (Buljac-Samardzic, van Woerkom, 
& Paauwe, 2012; Morey, et al, 2002; Naquin & Tynan, 2003). 
A process study of of how ability is developed focuses on Israeli fighter crews (Ron, 
Lippschitz & Popper, 2006). To reduce errors in flight procedures, crews not only relied on 
their own learning based on flying more missions and thus learning through direct observation 
and experience; rather, because they knew that subjective perceptions are incomplete and 
sometimes faulty, given the intensity and massive information processing that is required 
when piloting a fighter jet, after each mission the entire cadre held a debriefing. In the 
debriefing crews watched footage from aircraft cameras while talking through their 
perceptions of what had occurred. The review process allowed them to compare their 
perceptions with the footage, clearly see how imprecise real-time perceptions are, which 
helped them to make corrections, and convert subjective experiences to objective ones. The 
review process and the debriefing are imposed by the organization, it enhanced the teams’ 
abilities and also increased information-based opportunities since the debriefing sessions 
provided the crews with additional information. 
 
Organization-level ability to learn from failure 
We found fewer studies on organizational-level ability than on organizational-level 
opportunity or motivation. A study analyzing failure reduction across clinics that use a new 
heart surgery method used an indirect measure of clinic ability (Pisano et al., 2001). Carefully 
establishing that given the same opportunity (cumulative number of procedures, which had a 
large impact on learning) and motivation, organizations differed in how well they converted 
experience into higher performance: the 16 clinics in the study demonstrated different 
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learning curve slopes. After ruling out other opportunity-based explanations, the conclusion 
was that differences across clinics must be due to (unobserved) ability. A paper argues that 
organizational form, whether an airline is a specialist or generalist, can influence its ability to 
learn from failure (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). Generalists have a more complex 
organizational structure with the potential to complicate information processing and 
coordination, which in turn hampers learning. In the airline industry specialists compared to 
generalists were better able to learn from failures with heterogeneous, that is, more complex 
causes. Similarly, smaller hospitals (more specialized), compared to large hospitals (more 
generalists), have been found to engage in more learning behaviors related to major adverse 
events and near-misses (Ginsburg et al, 2010). 
More detailed measures of ability demonstrate that ability affects the absolute number 
of errors as well as the reduction of errors: hospitals achieve faster learning and fewer errors 
by implementing protocols and checklists developed from best practices across the industry 
(WHO, 2017; Thornlow & Merwin, 2009; Thomassen et al., 2-13). Checklists were originally 
introduced in aviation, where they have been partly credited with the rapid decline in 
accidents (Clay-Williams & Colligan, 2015). Hospitals with patient-centered units were better 
at processing and reporting errors and near misses, which suggests that the organization of 
work matters for an organization’s ability to manage failures (Rathert & May, 2007).  
 
 
SYNTHESIS ACROSS LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
A large body of literature finds that individuals, groups and organizations learn from prior 
failure experience. Information opportunities positively affect learning rate. The richer the 
information, the faster the reduction in errors and failure. Failure experiences generally 
contain more information than successful experiences (Kim & Miner, 2007). Most successes 
are “business as usual” contributing to learning by doing and other automatic responses, thus 
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enforcing existing routines. In contrast, failures trigger analyses and have greater potential to 
improve routines (Stan & Vermuelen, 2013). A lack of routines for error and failure 
management stops the information from passing through an organization (Gersick & 
Hackman, 1990; Kim & Miner, 2007). Larger-magnitude, more frequent and salient errors 
have greater information content and, hence, learning opportunities (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; 
Chuang & Baum, 2003; Madsen, 2009; Desai, 2011). Near misses also provide information 
about how to recover from a bad situation, which increases opportunities to learn (Kim & 
Miner, 2007). In general, studies find that “more is better” in regard to information-based 
learning opportunities; however, we would expect an overload when failures and errors are 
too frequent (Dahlin & Roulet, 2014). Information overload that leads to limited failure 
learning can hamper the ability to learn from failure. Accepting frequent errors due to 
information overload, that is, not learning from them, can also be a sign of low motivation to 
learn. These two factors—low ability and low motivation to learn—may be difficult to 
distinguish (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Dahlin & Roulet, 2014).  
Time-based, or temporal, learning opportunities operate in the same direction and in a 
similar fashion as information-based learning opportunities: a lower work load leads to fewer 
errors and failures since work load reduces the time that is available for learning (Malone et 
al. 2007; Lawton, et al. 2012). Nevertheless, some groups are able to analyze and process 
information faster, taking advantage of temporal learning opportunities to enhance their future 
performance (Edmondson, et al. 2001). Whether temporal opportunities can trigger learning 
also depends on whether individuals in organizations have autonomy to process and reflect on 
the errors and failures that they encounter (Kerr, 2009; Stern, et al., 2008). To that end, 
organizational design (e.g., workload, task autonomy) has the potential to lead to latent failure 
that hampers learning opportunities. 
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Even when opportunity to learn from failure—whether information- or time-based—is 
high, learning may not occur. While opportunity studies are more concerned with what 
enables learning, motivation studies focus on why learning does not happen. Conditions under 
which individuals attribute the causes of errors and failures to other factors, groups attribute 
the causes of errors and failures to factors other than the group collective, and organizations 
attribute the causes of errors and failures to individuals rather than organizational factors, 
reduce the motivation to learn, which leads to low error and failure reporting and lower 
learning rates (Chuang et al., 2007; Ellis et al., 2006; KC, Staats & Gino, 2013). A cost-
benefit model that is proposed by Zhou and Olivera (2006) offers an overarching explanation 
to this problem: the unbiased reporting of errors is only expected when the perceived 
reporting cost is low to both an individual and his or her organization, and the perceived 
benefits for reporting is high to both as well as to any victim(s) who are associated with the 
errors. All other combinations of costs and benefits distort the motivation to report and what 
will be reported, which in turn affects the opportunity to learn from failure. In empirical 
studies, climate or psychological safety can be thought of as a reporting cost. Patient-centered 
climate (Rathert & May, 2007), low hierarchical distance, non-blaming cultures (Kathri et al. 
2009) and high psychological safety (Tjosvold et al. 2004) lead to better reporting and 
learning. The perception of the benefits to reporting are affected by the same factors; 
however, this side of the explanation for failure learning is less investigated. 
On the organizational level, conflicting goals, often safety and profitability, affect the 
motivation to learn from failure: A recent failure highlights safety goals for employees; 
however, as time passes, the focus reverts to financial performance metrics (Haunschild et al., 
2015). This highlights the risk of taking failure reduction for granted, assuming that learning 
is irreversible. Unless learning is embedded in physical artifacts (better brakes, a new IT 
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trading system) or it becomes a part of organizational routine, there is always the risk that 
error and failure rates will reverse. 
Ability studies show that training programs and after-event analyses can improve 
individual and group abilities to correctly analyze situations (Keith & Frese, 2005). It is clear 
that such training is quite common, with checklists being used in different industries, such as 
aviation and health care, to enhance organizational safety work (Clay-Williams & Colligan, 
2015). 
 
Integration across mechanisms 
Most studies focus on one or (at most) two mechanisms, either opportunity, motivation or 
ability, and we know that they all matter for failure learning. We know less about how the 
mechanisms affect one another. While some studies have considered moderating effects (KC, 
et al., 2013; Madsen & Desai, 2010; Shepherd at al., 2011), mediation is more seldom 
mentioned. If opportunity to learn sets the stage (providing information for failure analysis 
that can improve routines and failure responses), motivation causes actors to be willing to 
attend to such information, and ability is the conversion of opportunity into higher 
performance. What we do not clearly know is how, and whether, these three mechanisms 
jointly affect failure learning. 
Theoretical arguments about how to combine the different mechanisms argue for a 
three-way interaction (Blumberg & Pringle, 1982; Reinholt et al., 2011). However, it may just 
as well be a moderation-mediation process where the opportunity to learn interacts with the 
motivation to learn, and such interaction is mediated by the ability to learn, which results in 
failure learning. The empirical research focuses on one or two of the mechanisms, at most 
testing two-way interactions (for instance, how ability and motivation jointly determine 
learning). The notion that reality is complex is illuminated by different findings, some of 
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which find interactions between factors, others of which find that one factor affects learning 
but is mediated by a second factor. Motivation is thus found to affect ability, but ability also 
affects motivation (Lawton et al., 2012; Hofman & Stetzer, 1998) with both paths leading to 
learning. Further, motivation and opportunity jointly lead to learning (Haunschild et al. 2015), 
opportunity affects ability, which leads to learning (Stan & Vermuelen, 2013) and opportunity 
and motivation interact to produce learning (Baum & Dahlin, 2007). It is clear that the 
interplay between the mechanisms is more complex than we originally thought, and this 
promises many different ways to stimulate failure learning. 
 
MOVING BEYOND THE THREE FAILURE LEARNING MECHANISMS 
The papers in the review section covered both error and failure reduction. While there are 
many similarities between them, errors and failures are different types of events (Zhao & 
Olivera, 2006). Errors are mistakes, slips or violations of procedures, and they might or might 
not lead to an adverse outcome (Rasmusen, 1982; Reason, 1990). Failures are adverse 
outcomes
3
, such as accidents, unexpected patient deaths or bankruptcies (Tucker & 
Edmondson, 2003). While reducing errors should reduce failures, in this section we will 
discuss how these two types of events have a complex relationship; through a better 
understanding of this relationship, we can also better understand the differences in learning 
rates.   
 
Differentiating process and outcomes 
         When we study failures, that is, adverse outcomes such as product recalls, accidents, 
bankruptcies or unexpected hospital deaths, we assume that the cause of an adverse outcome 
is an erroneous process. Correspondingly, when we study traditional learning with successful 
outcomes, we assume that processes that lead up to the outcomes are correctly executed. 
                                                      
3
 We use the terms adverse outcomes, failures and undesirable outcomes interchangeably.  
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Questioning the strong link between the correctness of processes and outcomes, there is an 
increasing interest in situations in which erroneous processes can still result in good 
outcomes, such as near-misses (cf. Kim & Miner, 2007) and latent errors (Ramanujam, 2003; 
Reason, 1990). It is also possible, but rarely discussed, that a correct process can lead to an 
adverse outcome, such as a patient dying, even after well-executed surgery
4
. We propose that 
to better understand failure learning we must decouple processes and outcomes, or, more 
precisely, independently assess whether a process is correctly performed and whether an 
outcome is desirable. We also argue that different settings have different frequency 
distributions for the process-outcome pairs and that opportunity, ability and motivation to 
learn from failures (and successes) depend on this distribution, which explains why lessons in 
failure learning in one setting can be difficult to translate to another. 
If we regard processes as either correct or erroneous, and outcomes as successes or 
failures, we end up with four possible process-outcome combinations (see Table 2). 
———————————————————————- 
TABLE 2 TO BE INSERTED HERE 
———————————————————————- 
          Success and failure learning. A correct process with a favorable outcome represents 
traditional learning in which the outcome motivates actors who continuously improve and/or 
exploit the process to further enhance the outcome. This is what we expect from production 
learning curves (box 1 in Table 2). A faulty process with an undesirable outcome represents 
the “normal” failure learning case—an error is made, which yields a bad result (a train driver 
falls asleep, ignores a signal, and collides with another train; box 4). The main thrust in 
success learning is on how to improve existing processes to enhance the number of successful 
operations per time unit and thus lower the cost per unit produced (Argote, 2012; Yelle, 
                                                      
4 Over time the number of different health interventions has greatly increased, many of which have been directed 
towards terminally ill patients (Maile, 2012). 
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1979). The main thrust in failure learning is the analysis of how to improve the processes, 
reduce errors, and thereby lower the risk of failure or reduce the number of failed operations 
per time unit (or as a share of all operations) (Reason, 1997).  
          The assumption is that box 4 is a good representation of failure situations: if there is a 
failure outcome, there must be a preceding error. As a consequence, failures should be 
reduced when errors are reduced, and this approach of error reduction lies behind much 
successful failure reduction (Reason, 1997; Van Dyck et al. 2005). Similarly, the assumption 
is that successful outcomes are due to an error-free process. However, there are two other 
possibilities in the matrix that complicate learning: the off-diagonal combinations where (1) 
an error has no effect on the outcome, that is, does not lead to a failure (Ramanujam, 2003), or 
(2) when there is a failure outcome without an error that has been committed (e.g., an “act of 
God”). The very existence of the off-diagonal combinations weakens the link between a 
process as being either correct and not, and its outcome as being either successful or not. We 
label the off-diagonal combinations spurious successes and spurious failures. An increase in 
spurious events leads to noisier learning processes because the cause-effect analysis becomes 
more complex, which in turn introduces difficulty in learning from both successes and 
failures. We expect that both spurious successes and failures complicate learning in general 
and failure learning in particular. Spurious successes and failures are likely to shift the 
attention of individuals and organizations away from the “true” causal-effects of failure, 
making failure learning challenging. Because successes tend to be vastly more common than 
failures,
5
 we failure learning should be more sensitive to the occurrence of spurious events.  
Spurious success. Not all errors lead to bad outcomes. We expect that both the 
motivation and ability to learn from an erroneous process is lower when an organization 
experiences a spurious success, that is, there is no negative outcome (Table 2, box 3). Further 
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lowering learning ability, many process errors are unreported (and sometimes also 
unobserved) and unreported errors are known as latent errors (cf. Ramanujam, 2013; Reason, 
1997). Latent errors can lower failure reduction because a near-failure without an adverse 
outcome can strengthen an erroneous behavior.. The lower the likelihood that an error will 
lead to a failure, the more the error is accepted and the lower the motivation to correct the 
error or to learn from it is (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008; Banja, 2010). The motivation to reduce 
errors is also compromised because risk perception changes when actors experience errors 
without negative effects (a train driver falls asleep but wakes up before missing the signal, or, 
if the driver misses the signal, no other train is on the line, thus, there is no collision—the 
conclusion is that being tired on the job is not such a dangerous thing). Japanese nuclear firms 
did not learn from other firms’ errors without adverse outcomes when these errors were 
similar to non-adverse outcome errors the focal firm had experienced itself (Mitsuhashi, 
2012). This suggests that spurious success also lowers the motivation to learn from others’ 
errors: Knowing that other firms in the industry experience similar errors without adverse 
consequences signals that these errors pose no real risk and thus require little attention. When 
latent errors start being accepted by organizational members as not leading to adverse events, 
we obtain what is called normalization of deviance (Banja, 2010; Vaughan, 1996). 
Normalization of deviance involves accepting errors and rule breaking. Deliberate rule 
breaking is usually a dismissal of rules that are considered to be ill-conceived or overly 
complex. It is a gradual process (Vaughan, 1996) and in the majority of cases, normalized 
deviance has no negative outcome.  
              Normalized deviance is often exposed after a dramatic failure event leads to patient 
death (Maxfield, Grenny, Patterson, McMillan, & Switzler, 2005), nuclear meltdown 
(Dekker, 2011), spectacular trading losses (The Economist, 2014) or the crash of a space 
shuttle (Vaughan, 1996). Normalized deviance means that there is an implicit or explicit 
Page 32 of 72Academy of Management Annals
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 
33
agreement among organizational members to ignore certain safety procedures or regulations. 
One effect of normalized deviance is that it complicates cause-effect analyses when a failure 
strikes: it is easy for analysis to focus on the deviance behavior, which might not be the main 
cause of the failure. After all, some procedures or regulations are probably outdated or 
ineffectual and ignored for good reasons. In health care, normalized deviance often involves 
the violation of safety rules that impede work flow and signal a lack of trust in operators 
(Banja, 2010). Normalized deviance can also come from institutional logics that became 
dominant over time inside an industry despite their clashing with broader order values and 
beliefs that lie outside of the industry (Roulet, 2015; Shymko & Roulet, 2017).  
Despite a weak link between latent errors and failure outcomes (cf. Dekker, 2011), 
some settings still exhibit strong learning under such circumstances (airline safety, automobile 
safety), and it would enhance learning if we can determine factors that trigger learning from 
latent errors. First, the human error and safety literature is focused on errors regardless of 
outcomes, with a clear acceptance that adverse outcomes are quite infrequent; however, 
despite the low probability of an error that leads to a failure, there is nevertheless a link 
(Reason, 1997). When the focus is on errors rather than outcomes, both motivation and ability 
to learn should be enhanced. Creating agencies whose mission is error detection and 
reduction, such as the NTSB in transportation, leads to a low tolerance for errors. Some 
agencies have the power to close down or fine error-prone organizations with the aim of 
limiting such trade-offs in organizations, thus enhancing the organizations’ motivation to 
engage in failure reduction. Organizations’ and their members’ ability to reduce errors is also 
improved as regulators help with cause-effect analyses and recommend or regulate safer 
behaviors (FRA, 2016).  
        Spurious failures. The fourth process-outcome combination is the case where a faultless 
process produces an adverse outcome (Table 2, box 4). For instance, well-executed surgery 
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can still lead to a patient dying, or correct driver behavior can produce an accident. We call 
this a spurious failure, and this particular outcome is problematic for failure learning for a 
number of reasons. A failure outcome often triggers a search for causes even if there is none. 
Such a search risks misattributing the process as faulty, and there is a risk that the 
organization will replace a good routine with a worse one or make inefficient changes, and 
thus the ability to learn is compromised. The good-process-bad-outcome option is fairly rarely 
studied; however, it is likely to be frequent in complex settings where many processes co-
occur and involve many different actors. Because organizations are twice as likely as an 
impartial observer to assign blame to an operator after a failed event (Perrow, 1999), spurious 
failures are risky for individuals who might be unfairly blamed for adverse outcomes when 
the organization looks for failure causes. Thus, spurious failures can lead to lower trust and 
lower reporting of actual errors, which lowers the motivation to learn (Hofmann & Stetzer, 
1998).  
Health care is an obvious case where we expect frequent spurious failures because very 
sick patients eventually tend to die regardless of treatment. Staff is acutely aware that many 
failures (such as death) occur for reasons that are unrelated to any procedures that they 
perform, and this leads them to accept bad outcomes as an unavoidable part of everyday 
activities. While the acceptance of adverse outcomes is necessary, there is a risk of acceptance 
spilling over and allowing errors and latent errors to be forgiven: Because death is an 
expected and even unavoidable outcome for many patients, even when the cause of death is 
an error instead of an underlying disease and the outcome should be recorded as a failure, the 
high incidence of spurious failures might mean that errors are not detected. In addition, even 
if an error is detected, it might be ignored and therefore not corrected (Kohn, Corrigan & 
Donaldson, 2000). In other words, normalized deviance can be affected by spurious failures 
as well as by spurious successes. 
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In summary, the more frequent spurious learning and failure, or bad-good 
combinations, there are (boxes 2 and 3), the more difficult it is to perform a correct causal 
analysis. The combination of process error—good outcome is probably more common than 
that of the process error—bad outcome. An analysis of airline crews found that an error was 
made in the cockpit during a flight at least every four minutes but that very few incidents or 
accidents resulted (Bird, 1969; Reason, 1997). Similarly, nurses commit errors once every 
hour; however, this rarely leads to bad outcomes (Tucker & Spear, 2006). In contrast, we 
have almost no information about how often a correct process results in an adverse outcome. 
Learning motivation is low when the off-diagonal events are frequent, as is the opportunity to 
learn given the noisy information. 
When there are many processes that can simultaneously go wrong, attending to all 
potential errors becomes cumbersome and this also makes cause-effect analyses difficult. 
Simulations are well suited to investigating these trade-offs as well as experimenting with the 
complexity of tasks, the number of involved parties, risk levels and how these factors affect 
motivation and ability to learn (cf. Denrell, 2003).  
 
The impact of spurious successes and spurious failures on slow- and fast-learning 
settings 
          Noise and uncertainty in the process-outcome relationship help to explain learning-rate 
differences across settings. In settings with more off-diagonal outcomes (boxes 2 and 3), we 
expect lower learning rates since both ability and motivation to learn are lowered, and causal 
inferences are more difficult to draw. Spurious success (box 3), for example, is more likely to 
occur in situations in which tasks are easy and the rate of success is naturally high, while 
spurious failures (box 2) will, by contrast, be more common when tasks are complex, the 
chance of making an error is high and the risk of failure is also high. In the health care sector, 
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relatively routine procedures would be expected to lead to a higher rate of spurious success. 
By comparison, complex and high-risk surgical operations are more likely to lead to spurious 
failures. Those contexts offer fewer opportunities to learn because there is less information on 
which to draw for further success. The learning process is also hampered by the difficulty in 
assessing and taking stock of ability: the more spurious failures there are, the greater the 
doubt about current abilities will be. We also expect that motivation to learn will be lower in 
settings with high rates of spurious failure and success given the ambiguity with regard to 
cause and effect.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
How can organizations best learn from errors and failures? We will suggest a number of 
approaches that are based on the ideas of maximizing the triad of learning mechanisms, 
opportunity, ability and motivation while taking into account the role of spurious failures and 
spurious successes. 
 
Opportunity to learn from failure 
Using multiple sources of event information and the role of regulations. What can 
organizations do when they experience few failures but still want to reduce future failure risk? 
There is an increasing emphasis in learning studies on vicarious learning in the form of 
organizations’ learning from similar others’ failures, successes and near-miss experiences 
(Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Kim & Miner, 2007; Madsen & Desai, 
2010), and thus one way to increase learning opportunities is to learn from others. Moreover, 
information about events is also provided by an array of industry stakeholders such as the 
press, unions, regulators, industry associations, insurance companies, equipment 
manufacturers, trade press and academics. All of these groups have an interest in failure 
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reduction, and some are mandated to collect data, investigate accidents and issue 
recommendations. They provide information, analysis and suggestions on how to reduce 
failures, and some of them are very active. However, management scholars have mostly 
ignored these stakeholders and the role that they play in identifying, analyzing and suggesting 
remedies for failures. As a consequence, there is an omitted variable bias in many studies, 
which overestimate the effect of one’s own or others’ ability to learn from failures (Dahlin & 
Roulet, 2014). In addition, it would be interesting to examine the relative impact of different 
learning sources on failure learning to better understand stakeholder roles. We call for future 
studies in management to include more industry stakeholders, or at least to control for their 
actions to better understand the sources of learning. While policy studies are engaging with 
this question to study the effect on an entire industry (Silbey, 2009; Dekker, 2011) they rarely 
analyze firm-level factors. 
Some key questions to ask when investigating the role of multiple parties are: Given 
different learning rates across industries: are there fewer sources of learning in slow-learning 
settings? Can a slower learning rate be explained by a lower opportunity to learn? 
Noise also lowers opportunity to learn: If slow-learning settings are more likely to 
combine a high failure volume and a high spurious failure volume, is it possible that lower 
failure learning rates are due to the difficulty to learn from spurious failures? Spurious failures 
create a great deal of noise, which makes cause-effect analyses complicated and makes more 
common failure cases (erroneous process—adverse outcome) difficult to analyze. Exploring 
these questions can further advance our understanding of the differences in failure learning 
across settings. 
Opportunity and the transfer of learning. One way to transfer best practices developed in a 
high-performing organization or industry to a lower-performing organization or industry is to 
use checklists (Degani & Wiener, 1993; Thomassen, Storesund, Søfteland, & Brattebø, 2014). 
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Checklists are required in aviation and their success has led to their adoption in health care. 
They are, for example, increasingly used in surgical procedures. Checklists have been 
effective in accelerating learning, with more rapid failure reductions in units that use surgery 
checklists than in units that do not use surgery checklists (Walker, Reshamwalla & Wilson, 
2012). However, in a meta-analysis of checklist studies, Thomassen et al. (2014) reported 
either improvement or no effects in the use of checklists. When some non-learning situations 
were more closely analyzed it was found that the checklists were not properly implemented—
some surgeons have resisted their use (Leape, 2014).  
Checklists are also used for data collection and analysis by US transportation safety 
agencies, such as the National Transportation Safety Board when they investigate accidents 
and has helped to reduce airline and train accidents (NTSB, 1998). Since the transportation 
sector is heavily regulated, all agencies are tasked with safety interventions and trained in 
using systematic tools while it is not clear if enforced checklists use by external agencies 
would be as effective in the health care setting. Maybe health care is too complex (different 
professional groups, hierarchical structures that complicate communication between groups, a 
large number of diagnostic and treatment options, complex information flow), thus requiring 
different tools to facilitate failure learning beyond learning on the procedural level? At the 
same time there are few other tools to facilitate information transfer that have been as 
extensively developed and whose impact is as well understood as the learning effects of 
checklists (Leape, 2014). We wonder what other methods and/or tools could be used to 
increase learning opportunities in general and which methods and/or tools might be effective 
for slow-learning environments in particular.  
 
Ability to learn from failure 
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         Ability is the learning mechanism that is most difficult to investigate, and we find a 
large gap in our understanding of how to improve ability. While there are case studies that 
conclude that failure learning is difficult, with many factors that are used to explain when 
learning will not occur (cf. Baumard & Starbuck, 2005), there are fewer studies that explain 
high learning rates (i.e., a better ability to learn from failure).  
Can ability to learn from failure be improved? After-event analysis and error management 
are ways to improve failure learning. Our review revealed that psychological safety and non-
hierarchical environments with good communication and coordination within and between 
teams also lead to more learning from errors and failures. This result then begs the question 
for organizations that lack good communication and have low psychological safety: how can 
they increase their failure learning ability? Can psychological safety be promoted by the same 
manager who pushes the norms of non-reporting? What types of action are necessary for 
organizations that wish to adopt the climate and norms of more successful failure learning 
organizations? Conversely, in organizations with good managerial support for error reporting 
and psychological safety, how can learning ability be further enhanced? 
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How much of learning is automatic? How does ability evolve? Some performance 
improvements in the learning-curve literature are virtually automatic; learning-by-doing is 
played out at the individual level (Thompson, 2012), and learning-by-doing implies that 
individuals’ abilities increase by themselves (but plateau after fairly few experience cycles, 
ibid.). How important is automatic learning in the context of failure learning? We expect 
some types of errors to diminish as operators gain experience. For instance, car drivers lower 
their accident risk within the first five years of driving, and we tend to ascribe this to success 
experiences. However, the failure learning studies have ignored the automatic learning effect. 
A general assumption is that performance improvements are due to active learning attempts. 
One of the most studied groups in the error research is nurses (e.g., Edmondson, 2004; Tucker 
& Spear, 2006); however, we see little discussion with regard to whether nurses’ error rates 
go down with tenure in the profession. Surgeons demonstrate failure reduction over time, thus 
it would be surprising if we would not see the same for nurses with respect to errors. 
However, if the link between errors and failures is weak, the effect of professional tenure may 
not be a reduction in errors but a reduction in errors that result in failed outcomes, that is, in 
converting potential failures into near-miss events.  
Again, considering the difference between settings, is there less room for automatic 
learning in slow-learning settings, thus requiring more deliberate learning for failure 
reduction? Examining these questions is both theoretically and practically meaningful. These 
questions help to advance our understanding as to how different types of learning occur. The 
answers to these questions have implications for practices as they help to develop intervention 
in organizations to enhance failure learning. 
 
Motivation to learn from failure 
Page 40 of 72Academy of Management Annals
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 
41
Scholars assume that safety and risk avoidance are central to any organization, such as 
airlines, mining companies, hospitals, or banks, and they often ignore that most organizations 
to some degree accept failure. Safer practices compete with productivity-enhancing 
investments and since viable operations are necessary for the future of organizations, 
productivity is usually prioritized over the potential risk of a future failure, impacting the 
motivation to invest in failure reduction (Haunschild et al., 2015). This is illustrated by 
airlines that experience more accidents after filing for Chapter 11 protection (ABCnews, 
2005) and by a famous quote in the freight rail industry: “Uphill slow, downhill fast, freight 
comes first and safety last” (Ahear & Schick, 2014). Low-prime-lending practices are risky 
behaviors that lead to short-term gains but jeopardize organizations and the banking industry. 
In other words, failure reduction attempts will almost always compete with other activities, 
which is a situation that we must acknowledge when theorizing about and investigating 
failure learning. In addition, some failures are seen as being unavoidable by managers, and 
they are relegated to productivity equations’ error terms and more or less accepted as a 
necessary evil rather than something to improve upon (cf. Jovanovic & Nyarko, 1995). Trade-
offs therefore help to explain the low motivation to reduce failure risks (Haunschild et al., 
2015). In many settings, regulators move in to change the balance, for instance, imposing 
fines if safety targets are not met. However, it ultimately comes down to decisions that are 
made by individuals and organizations on the costs that they are ready to allocate to learning 
and further improving their learning rate. 
This leads us to ask if slow-learning settings face stronger trade-offs between 
productivity-enhancing activities and failure reduction.  
Motivation and the case of non-learning: is motivation THE key factor in failure learning? 
A handful of empirical studies describe settings without failure learning even when similar 
events provide learning opportunities (Baumol & Starbuck, 2005; Tucker & Edmondson 
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2003). Their findings led some scholars to question if it failure learning is generally to be 
expected at all (Baumold & Starbuck, 2005). Analyzing these studies, we find that they 
describe situations with low motivation to learn (Baumold & Starbuck, 2005; Eggers & Song, 
2015), limited opportunity to learn in combination with low motivation to solve underlying 
problems (Tucker & Edmondson, 2003) and potentially an inability to learn due to low 
motivation (Eggers & Song, 2015). A conclusion is that failure learning is difficult since is 
only likely to happen when all three mechanisms are sufficiently activated, and that 
motivation is a necessary condition for deliberate learning. 
In an in-depth case study of a large European telecom firm that suffered 14 strategic 
failures with no learning, Baumol & Starbuck (2005) describe lack of systematic reporting 
about failed projects, lack of interest in better understanding what went wrong and managers 
making external attributions to explain away bad outcomes caused by internal factors. The 
authors find opportunity but low-to-no motivation to learn, which in the end resulted in no 
learning. Low motivation involved managers expecting that admitting failure would have 
negative career ramifications and possibly also harm the organization (many projects were 
imposed by external stake-holders and the firm was publicly listed). Applying Zhao & 
Olivera’s (2011) cost-benefit reasoning, the cost to the individual managers was high, the 
benefit to the organization not clear and, hence, low motivation to report was to be expected.  
We find a similar argument around individuals using external attributions rather than 
changing their own behaviour among Chinese serial entrepreneurs (Eggers & Song, 2015). 
Entrepreneurs with failed start-ups were less likely to alter the way they structured their 
companies than were entrepreneurs with successful start-ups. Rather, they pursued the same 
firm strategies and structures when launching a new venture which, in turn, increased the risk 
for failure. They preferred a new industrial setting which made the authors conclude that this 
inability to learn is in line with self-serving attribution theory: Using external attributions to 
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avoid altering ones’ method of working is an individual-level defense mechanism 
demonstrating both lack of motivation and inability to learn. In contrast, entrepreneurs with 
successful ventures who stayed in the same industry kept enjoying more success.  
Tucker and Edmondson (2003) report high incidences of errors without organizational-level 
learning in a study of nine hospitals known for nursing excellence. Front line nurses that 
constantly saw patients were confronted with many problems, such as errors and mistakes 
made by others, when executing their tasks. Surprisingly, the nurses’ error learning was low 
despite their skill and motivation. The reason for low error learning is that the nurses solved 
the problems themselves on an ad hoc basis since they rarely had time to deal with the 
underlying causes. As a consequence, the same errors were repeatedly made and failure rates 
remained high. The insight from this study is that the nurses were highly motivated to execute 
their work, got a confidence boost in effectively managing problems created by others, and 
had little time to provide feedback to the organization. This is both a story of lack of 
motivation that emphasizes that the motivation in question is about addressing underlying 
problems caused by others, and that the support structure did not offer sufficient opportunity 
to get to the root cause of the problems, both in terms of managerial support but also the lack 
of time-based opportunity to analyze errors and come up with solutions to reduce their 
recurrence.  
 Across these three non-learning cases motivation plays different roles: ego protection, 
career protection, protecting the organization and focus on other parts of the job than error, or 
problem reduction. In what way besides motivation do these non-learning cases contrast with 
learning cases? Are there more competing motivations in non-learning cases?  
Is it an illustration of how motivation is a necessary factor for learning to occur and without it 
neither opportunity nor ability matter? Also, how common are non-learning outcomes and 
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when do they matter? In the telecom case, the firm still did well and clearly was not very 
concerned with the failed strategic projects. When do organizations ignore failures?  
 
The nature of the failure event 
We suggest three areas of research to expand how we study failure events to improve 
causality in studies: using counterfactuals by applying the process-outcome matrix in Table 2 
when selecting events; extending our failure measures to also consider per-event learning; and 
standardizing or at least improving the measures of the learning process.  
Selection of the dependent variable. Few learning studies allow for both successes and 
failures to be key events in the research design (Denrell, 2003). Most studies choose to focus 
on either successful or failed outcomes (sometimes controlling for the other), and the set of 
factors that cause such outcomes. However, to extend our understanding of the relationship 
between processes and outcomes, the inclusion of both types of events in the research design 
would allow for stronger causal linkages. Currently, this is done in studies in which an 
intervention is randomly assigned to different organizational units and the outcomes are 
monitored, such as the introduction of checklists in health care into one subset of hospitals, 
while the comparison group works as before, and the reduction of adverse events is monitored 
(cf. Walker, Reshamwalla & Wilson, 2012). In checklist studies an outcome is either a 
success or a failure, thus the rate includes both possibilities while the focus remains on the 
effect of a single mechanism, the use of a checklist or not. The initiation of such studies are 
usually third-party organizations, such as the WHO, in the health care checklist example 
(WHO, 2017).   
Including both successful and failed outcomes would also allow for a study of the role 
that is played by noise in the learning process (the off-diagonal outcomes in Table 2) to cover 
the full range of process-outcome combinations, thus allowing us to better understand 
disturbances in learning processes.  
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Extending failure measures. The failure learning literature covers a diverse set of events, 
from bankruptcies to patient deaths to large-scale accidents that involve hundreds of victims 
who have been injured or killed. Some events occur once per hour and some occur once per 
week, while others occur once per decade. While the magnitude of events matter for learning, 
higher-impact events motivate organizations to respond more forcefully. An important 
question to ask is whether the sensitivity to failure events varies across industries, and, if so, 
what determines the level of sensitivity. In settings with many adverse events that are caused 
less by errors and more by the nature of operations (very elderly patients dying in health care, 
for instance), we expect a greater insensitivity to the adverse events that are caused by errors. 
Three dimensions that should matter when considering events are (1) the frequency with 
which failures occur; (2) the frequency with which adverse events that are NOT caused by 
errors occur; (3) the magnitude of the failure, including the failure magnitude when compared 
to industry averages (killed, injured, failure costs). Few studies show us how much a single 
failure event affects learning (see Dahlin & Baum, 2012 for an exception), which might 
provide a clue to how frequency and magnitude matter. A per-event measure would also make 
comparisons across setting more applicable. Here, a meta-analysis could reveal the different 
effects of failure events. 
 We expect the industries that experience a combination of high failure volume and 
high spurious failure volume to have an elevated error acceptance. Elevated error acceptance 
reduces the motivation to learn, which would explain a lower learning rate in such settings.  
 
Are learning rates overestimated? A paper critiquing the methods used in econometric 
studies of failure learning, argues that statistical estimations used in failure learning studies 
are prone to yielding falsely positive results (Bennett & Snyder, 2017). The authors point out 
that the classical learning model where current performance (cost per unit) is a logarithmic 
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function of accumulated experience (number of units produced) has some econometric issues 
when translated to failure learning and risk overstating the case for failure learning. Similarly, 
they point out the risk for false positive coefficient results increase when including successful 
as well as unsuccessful learning opportunities in the same equation. They recommend using 
moving time windows of past failures, and separating the success and failure opportunities 
into different estimations. Most studies already use moving windows and also discount events 
further back in time (albeit they do this for theoretical and data rather than estimation reasons) 
(cf. Baum & Dahlin, 20017; Kim & Miner, 2007).  
Even if Bennett and Snyder overstate the risk of falsely positive results, their paper 
raises a more fundamental question about econometric failure learning models. Usually a 
learning curve is assumed (often without this functional form being established as the one 
best-fitting the data) which means that a key assumption is that success and failure learning 
follow the same learning pattern. Similarly, when including both successful and failed prior 
events these are seen as additive which is an untested assumption. For instance, in traditional 
success learning, failed outcomes can be seen as reducing the learning rate but it is usually 
relegated to the error term. To model the interaction between success and failure, we need to 
develop new models accounting for both failure and learning as potential complements rather 
than substitutes. This way we could for instance see spill-overs from number of successful 
repetitions in learning-by-doing (such as driving a car) – when skills increase, errors and 
mistakes decrease as a function of more successful events. Rather than substitutes, there is 
complementarity with success learning leading to fewer failures and also enhancing failure 
learning. Conversely, we can observe that failure has a complex effect on normal operations, 
slowing down success learning since overall output might be reduced after a serious accident. 
The recommendation from Bennett and Snyder (2017) is to, for econometric reasons, not 
include both successful and failed events in the same estimations, we would argue that they 
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should also be estimated separately for theoretical reasons – we simply don’t know how they 
relate. 
 
Measuring failure and its responses. The empirical studies on failure learning face two 
measurement issues. First, individuals and organizations often fail to identify or report all 
failure events. This makes examining failures’ effects on learning processes more of a 
challenge. Common approaches to collecting failure and error data include using public 
archival data (e.g., Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Desai, 2015; Lawton et al., 2012), experimental 
designs (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008; Ellis et al., 2006), or employee recall (Ginsburg, et al., 
2010). Archival data and employee recall increase under-reporting biases, and the question is 
how to account for this when interpreting studies. Audits are, for instance undertaken in a 
number of industries, with the Federal Railroad Administration performing spot-checks on 
regulation compliance (FRA, 2017). Legal cases where non-reporting leads to penalties 
usually state the expected underreporting. Union representatives also have addressed 
underreporting.   
Second, our review revealed that there is a lack of common measures with regard to 
failure learning behaviors, such as the schemas that are used when responding to failures. 
Without common measures, it is difficult to compare the results from studies with different 
research settings. With few exceptions (cf. Ginsburg, et al, 2010; Shepherd et al., 2011) most 
studies measure broad learning behaviors, such as whether employees can challenge work 
processes or if they have improved work procedures, rather than learning behaviors that are 
specifically related to failures, such as the identification of an adverse event, cause analysis 
and corrective action. Most importantly, to better understand errors and failure learning 
requires a research design with an explicit link between failure events and the different 
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elements of learning behavior, such as Israeli flight crews’ post-event analyses (Ellis et al., 
2006).   
 
CONCLUSION 
Reviewing the literature on error and failure learning, we clustered learning mechanisms into 
three categories of opportunity to learn (the factors of information and time), motivation to 
learn (willingness to act) and ability to learn (competence to act). Failure and error learning 
have been studied across academic areas and address multiple levels of analysis, from 
individual, group and organizational perspectives. While motivation and ability factors 
dominate studies at the individual and group levels of analysis, opportunity factors dominate 
studies at the organizational level. Studies in health management are also concerned with 
procedure-level studies, with a wealth of data showing time trends for procedures on the 
national level, where learning diverges greatly across treatment types from negative, over no 
improvement, to some positive learning (Downey et al., 2012).  
 In summary, the findings suggest that more information about errors and failures in 
the form of one’s own and others’ prior failures or near failures facilitate learning. They go on 
to report that leaders and organizations with a punitive attitude toward errors and failures 
obtain less information because individuals in such organizations consider the cost of 
reporting to be too high. Additionally, they state that the ability to process and learn from 
errors and failures is partly based on attribution and inherent attitudes; however, this ability 
can be boosted through active post-event reviews. We argue that the cross-industry 
differences in learning rates depend on a number of factors. Among those factors, a noisy 
learning environment in which organizations experience spurious successes and spurious 
failures exerts a strong influence on failure learning. Noisy information about cause-effect 
makes failure information more difficult to interpret, which lowers learning opportunities and 
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ability. Spurious successes and failures also create ambiguity, which lowers the motivation to 
learn because the awareness of weak error-failure connections risks leading to normalized 
deviance, and it can also lower individuals’ motivations to report errors and failures. 
 An organization that seeks to enhance error and failure learning should analyze the 
causes of its most common errors and failures. To maximize the opportunity to learn, the 
organization should not only study its own but also the events of similar organizations. 
Further, including near-misses would add information and suggestions for ways to avoid an 
adverse outcome after a process error has occurred. When attributing causes, management 
must ensure that operators are not unduly blamed and if the cause is found to be operator 
error, look for systematic such errors to find if there are structural or organizational factors 
leading to operator error.  
 We propose a number of unexplored research areas in error and failure learning, some 
of which are related to a lack of linkages across academic disciplines. In short: management 
scholars tend to ignore the role that is played by regulators in failure reduction; policy 
scholars tend to ignore organizational differences and the role that is played by management 
in failure reduction; safety scholars have devised methods for the transfer of learning and for 
the development of ability; however, they have not yet fully established the efficacy of these 
tools. To that end, scholars across academic disciplines have “failed” to learn from each 
other’s failure research. Through our review, we have found fruitful opportunities for future 
research to learn from the extant failure studies to enhance our understanding of failure 
learning in organizations.  
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Table 1. Factors investigated in failure learning studies classified by level of analysis and mechanisms. 
 Opportunity Motivation Ability 
Individual 
level 
Perceived autonomy (Stern at el., 2008) 
Situational learning (Stern at el., 2008) 
Experience (KC, Staats, & Gino 2013) 
 
Motivation to learn (Zhao, 2011) and safety 
motivation (Buljac-Samardzic, et al. 2012; 
Neal & Griffin, 2006; Probst, 2015)  
Attribution (Ilgen and Davis, 2000; Nisbett and 
Ross, 1980; Ellis, Mendel & Nir, 2006; KC, Staats, 
& Gino 2013; Naquin & Tynan, 2003) 
Emotion (Edmondson, 1996; Paget, 1988; Keith & 
Frese, 2005; Neal & Griffin, 2006; Shepherd et al., 
2011; Zhao, 2011) 
Psychological safety (Carmeli & Gittell, 2009) 
Perception of outcomes (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008) 
Coping orientation (Shepherd et al. 2011) 
Training (Gully, et al., 2002; Keith & Frese, 2005) 
After-event reviews (Ellis & Davidi, 2005; Ellis, Mendel, & 
Nir, 2006) 
Coping orientation (Shepherd, et al., 2011) 
Relationships with others (Carmeli & Gittell, 2009) 
 
 
Group level Member rotation (Argote & Todorova, 2007) 
Group diversity and intergroup-linkages (Chuang et 
al. 2007; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003) 
Team stability (Edmondson, 1996) 
Routines to gather information (Lawton, et al. 2012; 
Edmondson, et al 2001; Tucker & Spear, 2006) 
Autonomy (Kerr, 2009) and load (Malone et al. 
2007) 
Group norms and team orientation (Katz-Navon, et 
al., 2009; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007; Zohar, 2002; 
Tjosvold et al. 2004) 
Psychological safety (Edmondson, et al. 2001) 
Tacit belief about failure (Cannon & Edmondson, 
2001; Edmondson, et al., 2001) 
Leadership style (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; 
Katz-Navon et al., 2009; Carmeli et al., 2012) 
Safety climate (Zohar & Luria, 2005) 
Status dynxamics (Edmondson, et al. 2001) 
Routines (Gersick & Hackman, 1990) 
Debriefing and reviewing abilities (Ron, et al. 2006) 
Resistance to change (Hodgkinson & Wright, 2002) 
Workload (Lawton et al., 2012) and autonomy 
(Kerr, 2009) 
Failure climate (Buljac-Samardzic et al., 2012) 
Leadership style (Buljac-Samardzic et al., 2012; Zhao, 2011; 
Cannon & Edmondson, 2001) 
Training (Morey, et al. 2002) 
Membership stability (Buljac-Samardzic et al., 2012) 
Understanding of team process (Baker et al., 2006) 
Workload (Lawton et al., 2012) and work process 
(Edmondson, 1996) 
Coordination and communication (Baker et al. 2006) to 
develop cooperative goals (Tjosvold et al. 2004) 
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Organizational 
level  
(includes 
inter-
organizational 
factors) 
Own and others’ failure experience and processes to 
collect information on those failures (Tucker & 
Spear, 2006; Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Chuang & 
Baum, 2003; Haunschild & Rhee, 2004; Haunschild 
& Sullivan, 2002; Kim & Miner, 2007; Madsen & 
Desai, 2010; Madsen, Dillon & Tinsley, 2016) 
Own success experience (Madsen & Desai, 2010; 
Pisano et al., 2001) 
Recency of event (Haunschild, Polidoro & Chandler, 
2015) 
Magnitude of event (Desai, 2011; Madsen, 2009) 
Complexity of problems (Stan & Vermuelen, 2013) 
Organizational size (Desai, 2009; Slonim, 2007) 
Near failures / near misses (Kim & Miner, 2007; 
Kessels-Habraken, et al. 2010) 
Geographic proximity (Kim & Miner, 2007) 
Performance aspirations (Baum & Dahlin, 2007) 
Media attention (Desai, 2011 and Desai 2014; 
opposite results) 
Reputation (Haunschild & Rhee, 2004; Rhee, 2009) 
Safety climate (Hofman & Stetzer, 1998) 
Other’s similar errors (Mitsuhashi, 2011) 
 
Organizational form (Hanschild & Sullivan, 2002) 
Failure climate (Khatri et al., 2009) 
Error management culture (Dyck et al., 2005) 
Leadership style (Desai, 2015) 
Culture, work load (Kralewski, et al. 2005; Malone et al. 
2007) 
Post-experience reviews (Ron, Lipshitz & Popper, 2006) and 
external pressures (Haunschild & Rhee, 2004). 
Patient-centered hospitals, climate (Rahert & May, 2007; 
Lawton et al., 2012) 
Standardized procedures/protocols (Thornlow & Merlin, 
2009) 
Organizational size (Ginsburg, et al., 2010) 
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Table 2. 2x2 table of four process and outcome combinations. 
 Outcome of event 
Success Failure 
 
 
Process/behavior/routine  
 
Correct 
 
1. Traditional learning 
 
 
2. Spurious failure 
 
Faulty 
 
3. Spurious success 
 
 
4. Traditional failure 
learning 
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Authors JOURNAL YEAR LEVEL OF  
ANALYSIS 
O/M/A
1
 DATA/SETTING METHOD N RESULT 
Edmondson Journal of 
Applied 
Behavioral 
Science 
1996 Group O, A Patient care groups Survey 8 units L=O, A 
Hofman & Stetzer Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
1998 Group M Utility company Field 
experiment 
Safety 
communication and 
attributions in 159 
groups 
L: AM 
Edmondson, Bohmer 
& Pisano 
Administrative 
Science 
Quarterly 
2001 Group M Team in hospitals Qualitative 16 hospitals L=M 
Cannon & 
Edmondson 
Journal of 
Organizational 
Behavior 
2001 Group M, A Organization teams Field study 51 groups L=M+A 
Haunschild & 
Sullivan 
Administrative 
Science 
Quarterly 
2002 Organization O, A airlines Archival data 310 airlines L=O*A,  
Specialist airlines learn more  
from heterogeneous accidents 
Tucker & Edmondson California 
Management 
Review 
2002 Group O, M Hospitals Qualitative 9 hospitals No learning 
Zohar Journal of 
Organizational 
Behavior 
2002 Group M Work groups Survey 49 groups L=M 
Gully, Payne, Kiechel 
Koles & Whiteman 
Journal of 
Applied 
Psychology 
2002 Individual A Undergraduate 
students 
Experiment 188 L=A 
Morey, et al. Health 
Services 
Review 
2002 Group A Emergency 
departments in 
hospitals 
Field 
experiment 
9 emergency 
departments 
L=A 
Hodgkinson & Wright Organization 
Studies 
2002 Team M Top management 
teams 
Qualitative 1 team L=M 
                                                      
1
 Please note that this is our interpretation of how to classify a study’s mechanisms. 
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Naquin & Tynan Journal of 
Applied 
Psychology 
2003 Individual M Graduate students Experiments 131 L=M 
Chuang & Baum Administrative 
Science 
Quarterly 
2003 Organization O Naming strategy Archival data 32 nursing home 
chain 
L=O 
Tjosvold, Yu & Huy Journal of 
Management 
Studies 
2004 Group O and M Organization teams Survey 107 teams L=M,O 
Keith & Frese Journal of 
Applied 
Psychology  
2005 Individual A Undergraduate 
students 
Experiment 55 L=A 
Ellis & Davidi Journal of 
Applied 
Psychology 
2005 Individual A Organizations Experiment 98 L=A 
Van Dyck, Frese, 
Baer & Sonnentag 
Journal of 
Applied 
Psychology 
2005 Organization A Organizations Survey 112 companies L=A 
Zohar & Luria Journal of 
Applied 
Psychology 
2005 Multilevel M Production workers 
in plants 
Survey 3952 individuals in 
401 group 
L=M 
Ron, Lippshitz & 
Popper 
Organization 
Studies 
2006 Group, 
organization 
M, A Fighter crews Observations of 
after-event 
reviews 
13 pilots and 
navigators 
L=A, M 
Neal & Griffin Journal of 
Applied 
Psychology 
2006 Individual M Hospital Longitudinal 
survey 
135 staff L=M 
Ellis, Mendel & Nir Journal of 
Applied 
Psychology  
2006 Individual M, A Undergraduate 
students 
Experiment 119 L=M, A 
Tucker & Spear Health 
Services 
Review 
2006 Multilevel O Nurses in Hospitals Qualitative 6 hospitals L=O 
Baum & Dahlin Organization 
Science 
2007 Organization O, M train accidents Archival data 189 railroad years L=M*O 
Underperforming train companies  
learn more from others’ failure 
experiences 
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Rathert & May Health Care 
Management 
Review 
2007 Individual A hospitals Survey 304 nurses, 3 
hospitals, same chain 
A gives M 
Kim & Miner Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
2007 Organization O Bank near-failures 
and failures 
Archival data 2696 banks L=O with near-failures being the 
important events 
Vogus & Sutcliffe Medical Care 2007 Group M Hospitals Survey 78 units in 10 
hospitals 
L=M 
Malone, Abarca, 
Skrepnek, Murphy, 
Armstrong, Grizzle, 
Rehfeld & Woosley  
Medical Care 2007 Multilevel O Pharmacy and 
pharmacist 
Survey + 
archival 
672 pharmacies L=O 
Stern, Katz-Navon & 
Naveh 
Management 
Science 
2008 Individual O Residents in 25 
departments of two 
teaching hospitals 
Survey 123 resdients L=O 
Dillon & Tinsley Management 
Science 
2008 Individual M Students and NASA Experiment 292 L=M 
Thornlow & Merlin Health Care 
Management 
Review  
2009 Organization A hospital routines Archival data 1430981 patient 
records, 115 
hospitals, 20 states 
L=A as a function of procedure 
Rhee Journal of 
Management 
Studies 
2009 Organization M Car recalls Archival data 54 U.S. automakers L=M, inverted U 
Madsen Organization 
Science 
2009 Organization O Mining accidents Archival data Recency of events L=O 
Kerr Social Science 
and Medicine 
2009 Group O, M Hospitals Qualitative 2 clinics L=O+M 
Carmeli & Gittell Journal of 
Organizational 
Behavior 
2009 Individual M, A Organizations and 
graduate students 
Survey 228 L=M+A 
Katz-Navon, Naveh & 
Stern 
Journal of 
Applied 
Psychology 
2009 Group M Hospitals Survey 123 residents, 25 
medical wards 
L=M 
Page 69 of 72 Academy of Management Annals
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Madsen & Desai Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
2010 Organization O Orbital launch Archival data 26 launch vehicle 
organizations 
L=O 
Ginsburg, Chuang, 
Berta, Norton, Ng, 
Tregunno & 
Richardson  
Health 
Services 
Research 
2010 Organization A Patient safety Survey 69 hospitals L=A 
Desai Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
2011 Press release 
Organization 
O, M Railroad accidents Archival data 234 press releases, 
391 firm-years 
L=M, O 
Mitsuhashi Industrial and 
Corporate 
Change 
2011 Organization M and O Japanese nuclear 
plants 
Archival data  56 reactors L=M, O has no effect 
Banja Business 
Horizons 
2011 Event A, M Health care Case histories 
and theory 
Description of 
systematic rule 
breaking 
L=M, A 
Carmeli, Tishler & 
Edmondson 
Strategic 
Organization 
2011 Group M Top management 
teams 
Survey 77 TMTs L=M*A 
Zhao Journal of 
Organizational 
Behavior 
2011 Individual M Undergraduate 
students 
Survey with 
experiment 
127 L=M 
Shepherd, Patzelt & 
Wolfe 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
2011 Individual M, A Research institutes Survey 585 L=M+A+M*A 
Downey, Hernandez-
Boussard, Banka & 
Morton  
Health 
Services 
Research 
2012 Procedure Trends, no 
mechanism 
Medical failure 
trends using US 
national data 
Archival data 7.6 million adverse 
events for 69 million 
hospitalizations 
14 procedures: 6 with decrease 1 with 
no change and 7 with increases in 
adverse events 
Muehlfeld, Sahib & 
Van Witteloostujin 
Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
2012 Transaction O Newspaper merger 
and acquisitions 
Archival data 4973 m&a attempts 
1981-2008 by 1964 
firms 
L=O, U-shaped relationship 
Buljac-Samardzic, 
Van Woerkom & 
Paauwe 
Health Care 
Management 
Review 
2012 Group A Hospitals Survey 152 teams L=A 
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Lawton, Carruthers, 
Gardner, Wright & 
Mceachan 
Health 
Services 
Research 
2012 Group O, A Hospitals Qualitative 3 wards L=O*A 
Stan & Vermeulen Management 
Science 
2013 Organization O Fertility clinics Archival data 116 UK fertility 
clinics 1991-2006 
O--> A --> L 
Zheng, Miner & 
George 
Industrial and 
Corporate 
Change 
2013 Patent (IVs on 
individual and 
group levels) 
M, O University 
technology transfer 
office 
Archival and 
interviews 
778 patents of which 
170 were licensed 
L=M*O 
Kc, Staat & Gino Management 
Science 
2013 Individual O, M Hospitals Archival data 71 cardiac surgeons L=O+M+M*O 
Desai Journal of 
Management 
2014 Organization M Air traffic 
controllers, near 
misses 
Archival data US class I railroad 
firms 
L=M 
Haunschild, Polodori 
& Chandler 
Organization 
Science 
2015 Organization O Pharmaceutical 
firms, drug recalls 
Archival data 146 firms L=O, M 
Motivation varies over  
Time. 
Eggers & Song Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
2015 Individual M, A Serial entrepreneurs 
in China 
Survey 253 entrepreneurs L=M, A tested, no learning 
Probst Journal of 
Applied 
Psychology 
2015 Individual M 33 organizations Survey 1238 L=M 
Desai Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
2015 Organization O Heart bypass 
surgeries 
Archival data 116 hospitals L=O 
Madsen, Dillon & 
Tinsley 
Risk Analysis 2016 Organization O Airlines Archival data 64 commercial 
airlines 
L=O 
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Khanna, Guler & 
Kerkar 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
2016 Organization O Pharmaceutical 
industry 
Archival data 97 pharmaceutical 
firms 
L=O 
Desai Industrial and 
Corporate 
Change 
2016 Organization O Railroad accident Archival data US railroad firms L=O 
Bennett & Snyder Strategy 
Science 
2017 Event O Liver transplant data 
but mainly methods 
paper 
Simulated and 
archival data 
111619 US liver 
transplants 
No learning + risk of type I errors in 
learning studies 
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